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Summary
In Hungary, the energy sector was modernised on the basis of public ownership after 
World War II. Hungary’s large, centrally controlled and vertically integrated energy 
systems were established at that time. Simultaneously with the regime change, west-
ern-based energy orientation also began in the energy sector and in 1990 it continued 
with the implementation of privatisation. Hungary’s accession to the European Union 
provided grounds for and reinforced the process ideologically. This was followed by 
full liberalisation called “market opening”. The policy of the second Fidesz govern-
ment, formed in 2014, is characterised by the restoration of an energy policy serving 
national interests. This process is described in the article in a European perspective.
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Privatisation and liberalisation after the regime change
In Hungary, the energy sector was modernised on the basis of public ownership af-
ter World War II. Hungary’s large, centrally controlled and vertically integrated en-
ergy systems were established at that time. Simultaneously with the regime change, 
western-based energy orientation also began in the energy sector. In 1990, after the 
taxi drivers’ blockade, it began with imports and price liberalisation in the energy 
industry, and continued with the preparation and subsequent implementation of pri-
vatisation. Eastern (Soviet) advisors were replaced by western consultants; some of 
the Hungarian “specialists” also joined them. In 1995 and 1996, extreme privatisation 
Dr Márton Járosi , President, Energy Policy 2000 Association (drjarosi@enpol2000.hu), 
Pál Kovács, Chief of the Cabinet of the minister in charge of the Paks capacity increase 
(kovacsp@mvmpaks2.hu).
68
Márton Járosi – Pál Kovács: Energy Policy of Hungary
took place with foreign dominance. Hungary’s accession to the European Union pro-
vided grounds for and reinforced the process ideologically. This was followed by full 
liberalisation called “market opening”, which meant, in the electricity industry, that 
electricity became a stock exchange commodity and market prices became separated 
from the prime cost.
Energy policy of restoration
Relying on the legacy of the founding fathers of the European Union, the policy of 
the second Fidesz government formed in 2010 was driven by the idea of a “Europe of 
Nations” based on Christian roots, which has also been laid down in the new consti-
tution. The restoration policy of the government can be summarised as “capitalism, 
social responsibility and Christian democratic economic policy”. It broke with the 
neoliberal doctrine that the market rules everything. The state’s responsibility once 
again came to the fore. It was recognised that under market economy conditions the 
interests of the community cannot be successfully enforced solely by regulatory instru-
ments; the active presence of the owner in the market is also essential. The energy 
policy was shaped by taking into account the financial capabilities of the country. Its 
foreign energy policy was characterised by opening to the East and strengthening 
Central and Eastern European regionalism. All forms of energy privatisation were 
stopped. The restoration and recovery and, in certain areas, expansion of the com-
munity ownership of utility systems began.
Global trends in the energy sector
Global trends in the energy sector are the characteristics of the “new world order” (Fe-
nyves, 2013): “free market”, the instability of political and financial systems, deregula-
tion and globalisation. In this world, reliable long-term energy planning, such as the 
planning of energy and capacity demand and of establishment and operating costs, 
is very difficult, almost impossible. The main influencing factors are financial limita-
tions, (lay) public opinion, media, economic fluctuation (inflation, interest rates and 
foreign exchange rates) and political considerations. According to the famous saying 
of British political economist Susan Strange (1986), in the current so-called “casino 
capitalism”, speculation and financial trading are the most important.
Fossil resources
The consequences of the surge in shale gas production in the US,1 which may allow 
the US become an oil exporter, are still unforeseeable, but will certainly be very signif-
icant. “It will change American foreign policy, in the sense absolutely that American 
foreign policy will not be focused on energy, but on strategy. Due to shale gas, it will 
not be dependent on oil-producing countries and compelled to serve dictatorships in 
the Middle East” (Tálas, 2014). Increased natural gas usage will result in a decline in 
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coal usage, which will push the world’s coal market in the direction of supply, and will 
also reduce the price of coal. The United States and Canada are likely to become net 
oil exporters by 2030 and will be larger producers already in 2 years than the world’s 
two currently biggest oil powers, Saudi Arabia and Russia. Simultaneously, the main 
directions of hydrocarbon transport will change.
Consequences for world powers
Energy prices are low in the US. This may lead to the repatriation of a significant part 
of previously outsourced industrial production. Accordingly, the United States may 
slightly increase its exports associated with energy-intensive industries until 2035, con-
trasted by a possible decline of combined European and Japanese exports by nearly 
one-third. Through its technological monopoly, the USA will acquire a new “weapon”. 
The theatres of struggle for world domination, raw materials, energy and oil may be 
rearranged. The significance of Middle and Far Eastern countries in world politics 
may change. The role of petroleum-producing countries (OPEC) may be revalued. 
This means that the world’s lines of power will shift, which may have a destabilising 
effect. The propaganda of globalism about the sustainability of consumption may be-
come stronger: you can consume, consumption is sustainable, there is no need to 
switch paradigm. At the same time, the various myths of “saving the world” (climate 
protection, struggle against global warming) may weaken. However, the chances for 
the only correct action, adaptation, may decrease.
European Union – “Energy communism”
“Setting the objectives of the energy economy as seen in the Europe 2020 strategy 
can be attributed to the political and philosophical attitude of certain leaders of the 
European Union, and mostly to Jeremy Rifkin’s intellectual influence. According to 
Rifkin, changes, which can be conceived as an industrial revolution, have taken place 
when the methods of energy generation and communication have changed. Now 
the internet and the use of renewable energy form the basis of the quality change, 
the third industrial revolution, in which collectivised production and consumption 
are pursued using smart electricity networks, in the form of some sort of energy com-
munism (Katona, 2013). The theatre of this grandiose experiment is the European 
Union, where there are five programme points for building the future: 
1) use of renewable energy; 
2) implementation of local, distributed energy generation; 
3) provision of solutions to electricity storage by starting to use hydrogen energy 
and other methods; 
4) establishment of smart electricity networks, creating a kind of energy internet, 
in which everyone is both generator and consumer (producer + consumer = pro-
sumer) at the same time;
5) conversion of transport to electric and fuel-cell drive.”
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This programme would create a new “industrial platform”, a mega-technology, 
on which new generation methods are realised. The establishment of a carbon-free 
economy in the EU by 2050 would require about EUR 270 billion per year. It is a 
fact that the favourable effects of this “revolutionary experiment” on the European 
living space are not visible. The results of the European Union’s efforts are mar-
ginal also in global climate protection and do not offset the strong increase in emis-
sions by emerging economies. The fact that the countries will scale back their ener-
gy- and emission-intensive production and consumption and thereby the European 
Union’s carbon-free economy is propelled to the top within the foreseeable future 
seems a highly unlikely vision. Such a radical change is hardly to be expected in 
the current space of power. The exploitation of renewable energy sources and the 
increase of energy efficiency may be the dogma of self-salvation, but it is not only 
ineffective in the consumption-centric medium of modern economy and society, 
but would also probably tragically set back the development level of economically 
weaker societies.
Consequences of EU accession in Hungary
At the time of accession to the European Union, our country was under enormous 
pressure. The highly profitable industries, including energy supply, were acquired by 
large, in part state-owned Western European companies, just under the pretext of EU 
accession. In fact, they expropriated our markets. Whatever remained in the hands of 
the state are still in good working order, and this is why no considerable breakdown 
has occurred in our electricity system, which was felt by the population. By contrast, 
the majority of the power plants, which had become, in essence, foreign property, 
with the exception of the Paks Nuclear Power Plant and the transmission grid, have 
significantly deteriorated. The provision of electricity supply on the supply side has 
become a commercial activity to a significant extent. Today, about 30 per cent of do-
mestic electricity consumption is supplied from abroad.
Energy balance
The structure of Hungary’s energy balance has been unfavourable since the begin-
ning of the hydrocarbon era, the 1960s. The proportion of natural gas has become 
excessive in the Hungarian energy balance and in its use for heating and electricity 
generation. Currently two-thirds of all primary energy sources come from Russian 
imports (calculated without fissile fuel). This situation cannot be changed substan-
tially for a long time with any energy source, even with renewable energy. We have to 
live with this. Therefore, the responsible government seeks to expand its latitude, by 
taking into account these conditions, in international natural gas supply and storage.
Hungary can join the shale gas revolution later (Leszák, 2014). Primarily the regu-
lations and licensing hinder today European and Hungarian developments related to 
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unconventional gas reserves, while a surge in production would result in a completely 
new situation in the markets of the continent. The occurrence of shale gas in Europe 
would allow within 6 to 10 years that unconventional gas reserves appear in the mar-
kets of both the continent and Hungary to a considerable extent. The unconventional 
gas technology is relatively new and changes quickly, so it is not impossible that gas 
production will also be economical in the more distant future in Hungary (in the 
Makó trench). It is in Hungary’s interest to create a regulatory environment that al-
lows for economical production.
Environmental protection
The recognition of the limits to growth have strengthened environmental movements 
that raise the consciousness of humanity. It is regrettable that these noble efforts have 
also increasingly fallen victim to manipulation by global powers (Héjjas, 2013). The 
Greens have become policy-shaping factors both in Europe and in our country. Glo-
balism tries to put this, too, to its own service. Economic operators and politicians 
have recognised the business and propaganda potential in environment protection 
and tried to influence such movements. The attitude towards renewable energy has 
become unduly pronounced within energy policy. More environmentally sound so-
lutions, “renewable energy”, are much more expensive than conventional sources, 
further increase costs to consumers and re-create the basic problem, imbalance, while 
investors get extra profit from high-priority grants. It would be a minimum step to-
wards rationalisation if renewable sources were also evaluated through the market 
and their costs also included the financial burdens caused by them, which others are 
still forced to cover (external costs).
Renewable energy lobby in Hungary
One of the key characteristics, which however carry risks, of the Hungarian en-
ergy policy was the uncritical commitment to the EU’s unilateral renewable energy 
policy. “Renewable energy strategies” were developed in this spirit. The agricultural 
lobby, with close ties to the MSZP (socialist party), was the main standard-bearer 
in this matter, since the large-scale production of biomass considered a priority al-
lowed fabulous EU grants to be obtained. There was real competition in the energy 
market only for these grants for a long time. Previously, the SZDSZ (liberal party) 
was the main champion of environment protection, and it endeavoured to use this 
field to strengthen its political support. More recently, the LMP (new liberal party) 
has replaced it and is making efforts at taking over its role. Unfortunately, the MSZP, 
which has lost its power, is changing its position in energy matters also increasingly 
in this direction. This is clearly manifest in the fact that they have abandoned the 
national consensus previously reached on the issue of the expansion of the nuclear 
power plant.2
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Climate protection
In terms of taking into account environment impact, “climate protection” is impor-
tant in our country; it is dealt with by the National Adaptation Strategy (NAS-2). It 
consists of three main parts:
– National Climate Change Strategy (NÉS) (NFM, 2013) which aims to reduce 
global warming as much as possible;
– Decarbonisation Strategy (DS), which aims to reduce, theoretically eliminate, 
carbon dioxide emissions;
– National Adaptation Strategy (NAS), which aims to manage and adapt to the 
impact of inevitable climate changes and to minimise possible damage.
Energy receives an excessively pronounced role in the above strategies. The Hungar-
ian energy policy also begins to recognise this: “As long as climate policy is closely linked 
to energy policy, no success can be reached in the energy sector; therefore, it must be 
separated from the energy policy”, said Pál Kovács, Minister of State of the Ministry of 
National Development at the National Mining Conference (Portfolio.hu, 2013).
We cannot meaningfully influence climate change on the Earth. The role of hu-
man activities in climate change, or even the possibility of substantially influencing 
it, is not scientifically proven. Decarbonisation intending to curb is manipulation by 
agents of globalisation. It is not true that “it is in our strategic interest... to implement 
sustainable economic growth”, as stated by NÉS-2 (p. 4). In fact, constant economic 
growth, on which the global economy is based, is not sustainable. Without limiting 
our consumption ourselves, humanity cannot be saved. The question is whether there 
is any chance to build a world of other values.
It must be understood that, although each topic has to be addressed due to our 
commitments to the European Union, our own resources may only be used for objec-
tives that promise substantial results. As many of the grants provided by the European 
Union for various projects as possible have to be used for goals that we also consider 
sensible. This is how the National Adaptation Strategy becomes really important for 
us, which is indeed about the future of the country.
Our only chance for survival or, more modestly, for renewing the life of our nation 
is if we, as a small nation, smartly adapt to both changes on our Earth that we virtually 
cannot influence and to shifts in world politics. We must agree with the “Adaptation 
vision” set out in the NÉS-2 (p. 8): “prepare for the inevitable and prevent what can 
be avoided”. We must have a similar attitude towards global world politics. In order to 
be able to cope with all this, it is insufficient for us to be smart, we must also remain 
healthy and viable. This is how we get to the fundamental recognition the NAS is 
about. One must start from the whole, the requirement of viability. All sub-strategies 
pointed out for different reasons must serve this requirement collectively, in a com-
plex way, with the minimisation of inconsistencies as much as possible. This is in the 
interest of the community. We must stand on the good side, the side of life, and we 
need to find allies for this both in the European Union and all over the world. Our 
nation’s cultural history provides grounds for this.
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Energy security
The dependence on the import of primary energy sources from Russia cannot be 
reduced significantly in the foreseeable future; absolutely not with renewable sources, 
and only in part with domestic lignite. The effects of even the best measures will be 
felt only in the long term. This recognition must lead the foreign energy policy of the 
government. The European Union should promote the security of supply primarily 
with the common market of imported primary energy sources. By contrast, dominant 
states have their separate ways. Bypassing about half a dozen EU Member States, the 
largest east-west gas pipeline was established between Russia and Germany, and the 
procurement of natural gas from the east, which is essential for Europe, has been 
degraded to a separate agreement between Russia and Germany. There have been 
hardly any primary energy projects with a common European interest for the develop-
ment of our region to date. Since, in this respect, the Visegrad countries share com-
mon interests in the energy sector, it is possible and necessary to coordinate them with 
the framework of enlarged Central European regionalism.
It is possible to achieve the security of supply primarily by political guarantees and 
common energy investments providing grounds for them, not giving up the notion 
that the single market of energy sources must also be strengthened in the European 
Union. The task of Hungarian energy policy is to influence the EU’s energy policy 
with due consideration to Hungary’s interests. Any change can be achieved in the 
EU only with determination coupled with professional competence if there is a goal 
that can be well communicated and to which the Member States’ consent can be ob-
tained. To do so, we must take advantage of the potential of the Visegrád cooperation 
and other similar efforts appearing elsewhere. The “Visegrád countries” must take 
joint action to modify the regulation of the energy market by the EU. Market regula-
tion must be democratised in such a way that these rules may take affect only by the 
unanimous vote of the Member States, and it must be allowed that Member States be 
able to opt out from internal market regulations that are detrimental to them. Joint 
action must be taken in order to diversify gas supply and against the discrimination 
of nuclear power generation as well as in the operation and construction of nuclear 
power plants. It must be ensured that the European Union accepts the necessary and 
appropriate assumption of this role by the state.
National Energy Strategy 2030 (NES) 
The Hungarian energy policy had to take it as a basis that we can count only on 
ourselves in terms of the security of supply. Taking this into account, Hungary must 
follow a strategy that, apparently in accordance with the EU’s objectives, achieves the 
security of supply, reduces dependence on imports, and facilitates that both retail and 
industrial consumers obtain electricity at an affordable price.3
In Hungary, establishing a rational primary energy structure is vital for the whole 
national economy, and fundamentally determines the coordinated feasibility of the 
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fundamental requirements of energy policy (security of supply, sustainability and 
competitiveness). The NES completed in 2010 interpreted the security of supply as 
one of the pillars, a factor that is partly a function of the tolerance of society, but the 
increase of which is in the national interest. The NES not only determines the optimal 
directions for development until 2030, but also spells out the basic solution also for 
the period up to 2050: the need to achieve an electricity sector based on three pillars, 
i.e., nuclear, coal and renewable sources, and the possible paths for achieving this.
Gas supply
Along with ever-decreasing domestic production, the country will be supplied with 
Russian gas in the long term. The supply of natural gas is ensured as a result of good 
energy cooperation with Russia and the establishment of gas storage capacities. Gas 
supply to Hungary is ensured under an agreement until 2021, and negotiations have 
been started for the post-2021 period. For us, the most important is that the Russian 
raw material reaches Hungary under any circumstances.4 The revival of the South 
Stream would be in our interest, while we gladly participate in the Turkish Stream.
The primary energy source with the largest share is natural gas, which is especially 
important from several points of view and which cannot be changed even in the long 
term. The responsible government must aim to increase the latitude of energy market 
operators by taking into account these conditions and to help supply the consumers 
with an energy source that is available reliably and at a reasonable price. The most 
important tools of this are:
– supporting the wholesale gas market through to the diversification of sources, 
expansion of liquidity and its development in a regional direction;
– acquiring state ownership in the case of strategic infrastructure elements impor-
tant for the security of supply and key market operators.
Through the repurchased gas market infrastructure and its strong presence in the 
market, Hungary will be able to operate as an important market centre in the Eastern 
and Central European Region. Due to its presence in the market, our bargaining posi-
tions will improve when agreements are concluded for the reservation of gas capaci-
ties, which is key for supplying the country.
Renewable sources
There are good options for using traditional biomass, because the area and yield of 
forests in Hungary keep increasing. Only half of the full annual surplus (which can be 
used) is suitable for industrial use in part, while the other half is of firewood quality. 
With the combustion of this and organic waste, a significant amount of heat energy 
can be produced, which can be primarily used for individual heating and making 
hot water. Several previously coal-fired power plants have been converted in whole 
or in part to biomass firing in Hungary. Only small biomass power plants and district 
heating works operate in a few municipalities. In 2016, the electricity generated from 
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renewable energy sources provided for only 5.5 per cent of the total gross electricity 
consumption (Hárfás, 2017). It can be established that with its share of over 50 per 
cent most of it was still provided by biomass, that is, wood combustion.
Wind energy and solar energy accounted for 27 and only 1.75 per cent, respectively, 
of the total quantity of electricity, 2,406 GWh, generated from renewable sources. 
Taking into account their installed capacity and the quantity of electricity generated, 
wind power plants could generate electricity only at an annual utilisation rate of 22.5 
per cent: wind turbines with a total capacity of 329.3 MW installed in the system could 
operate in reality at an average capacity of only 71.9 MW over the year. The fulfilment 
of the commitments made to the EU with respect to the use of renewable energy 
sources could only be achieved with very significant state subsidies. It is a question 
whether there are/will be funds and from where/whom, and at what pace it is worth 
carrying out the programme. The government does not want to put this burden on 
the population, but putting it on industrial consumers would worsen the positions of 
businesses competing in the world market.
At a biogas plant, energy generation is only an accessory activity, since the primary 
goal is to reintegrate biological waste into nature with minimum nuisance and mainly 
at minimum costs. In Hungary, about 46 biogas plants produce biogas currently with 
a total electrical capacity of 37 MW. Of these, 31 form part of farms, with a total capac-
ity of 21 MW. About four or five additional plants are currently under construction.
Electricity supply
The dangers of liberalised electricity markets also have their effect on our country. 
The level of wholesale prices is so low that it does not in itself guarantee any return on 
investment into any production equipment. In fact, it usually does not cover major re-
furbishments and overhauls either. The availability of a number of power plants keeps 
declining. The construction of power plants in Hungary has become an unavoidable 
necessity. Since there has been no power plant construction plan since privatisation, 
there is no responsibility for supply, we are at the mercy of the intentions of market 
operators. The consequences of irresponsible energy privatisation and liberalisation 
have fallen on us.
Electricity supply can be maintained only with significant imports amounting to 
30 to 40 per cent. As a result of the subsidisation of renewable sources by the state, 
surplus capacities have occurred temporarily in certain EU Member States. However, 
the low market prices do not cover the fixed costs of conventional power plants; there-
fore, their shutdown is continuous and the possibility of imports decreases. The ca-
pacity available for exports was still 3,600 to 7,700 MW in 2016 during the winter peak 
load. However, there will be a capacity shortage by 2025 also in the Central European 
Region, they will be unable to export. Every Member State must prepare for its own 
secure supply of electricity. The security of electricity supply is not guaranteed. The 
efforts of the government for the expansion of the Paks Nuclear Power Plant and the 
importance of the expansion of lignite-based power generation by the Mátra Power 
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Plant must be assessed in the light of this. “The question is not whether there is a 
need for Paks II, but what else do we build in addition to meet the requirements” 
(Innotéka, 2017).
Construction of power plants 
According to the technical analysis of Magyar Villamosenergia-ipari Átviteli Rendsz-
erirányító Zrt. (MAVIR, Hungarian Transmission System Operator Private Limited 
Company), the required installed capacity of the Hungarian electricity system may be 
13,551 MW until 2030. Of this capacity, large power plants may represent 11,051 MW 
capacity and small power plants (wind, solar, hydro, etc.) 2500 MW capacity in the 
future (Mavir, 2015).
Figure 1: The necessity of fund raising
13 000
12 000
11 000
10 000
9 000
8 000
7 000
6 000
5 000
4 000
3 000
2 000
1 000
0
2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029
year
peak load
M
W
  nuclear        natural gas     weather-dependent         other renewable
  coal          oil     other non-renewable      required new
Source: Mavir, 2015
A study on the subject shows that the total gross capacity of domestic power plants 
was about 8,900 MW at the end of 2014 (of which, however, only 7,290 MW was avail-
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able in reality) (Hárfás, 2015). Of this capacity, as a result of phasing out due to wear 
and tear,5 only 4,887 MW capacity may remain in the service of domestic electricity 
generation by the end of 2030. It follows that about 8,600 MW new power plant capac-
ity will need to be established until 2030. This in turn means that in addition to the 
2,400 MW capacity of the two new units at Paks, it will be necessary to install an addi-
tional 6,300 MW capacity (gas and renewable) in the system to ensure a secure supply 
of electricity to domestic consumers in the future.
Lignite power plant
It would be obvious to also use the domestic lignite resources, because they ensure 
a stable prime cost for electricity generation. The already planned development has 
fallen victim to climate protection, the “virtual bugbear” CO2 quota. In the near fu-
ture, a decision must be made between two alternatives regarding the utilisation of 
lignite, considered a major domestic fossil energy source, for energy purposes. One 
alternative is to build a lignite-fired power plant for economic reasons and reasons of 
security of supply. Alternatively, it is advisable to reserve lignite for a later time, when 
we can count on natural gas to a smaller extent or only at very high costs. In both 
cases, the increase in CO2 emissions due to lignite-fired power plants can be offset by 
the increased use of nuclear energy (instead of natural gas).
Maintenance of the capacity of the Paks Nuclear Power Plant
All this means that it is absolutely necessary to maintain the capacity of the Paks Nu-
clear Power plant, since the “lack” of the two new units in Paks would result in los-
ing, until 2030, a capacity providing a base load of nearly 2,400 MW to the electric-
ity system, which is key to both competitiveness and climate protection. This would 
represent serious security of supply risks in the future. Therefore, taking into account 
Hungary’s inherent natural conditions and the limits of our available energy sources, 
the use of nuclear energy may not be circumvented in the coming decades in order to 
ensure secure and reliable energy supply and, at the same time, the required degree 
of energy independence.6 As we have seen, there is a shortage of capacity in the elec-
tricity system. At present, the security of supply can be ensured only with significant, 
more than 30%, imports, that is, a power plant must be built. Since the potential for 
renewable-based electricity generation is highly limited, the international figures of 
electricity generation also make it clear that nuclear electricity generation is unavoid-
able.7 This provides grounds for the need for the nuclear power plant.
The development of Paks II was a necessary decision and it also fits into world 
trends. In relation to the expansion of the Paks Nuclear Power Plant, it is important 
to reiterate that private operators, which do not have any supply obligation, do not 
build power plants in the liberalised energy market. This is why a responsible state is 
forced, in the interest of its citizens, to establish the capacities essential for supply. The 
construction of power plants is widely known to be a very expensive investment with 
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Figure 2: Development of nuclear capacities in Hungary until 2038
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returns over a long time. Under Hungary’s present conditions, with special regard 
also to the fact that as a result of privatisation, the majority of the profits generated 
were taken out of the country by the foreign owners in the energy industry in the 
preceding decades, there is no money for development. That is, we can build power 
plants only from loans.
We entered into an agreement with Russia because besides appropriate technical 
quality they had offered funds under terms more favourable than market terms and the 
terms of IMF loans. The nuclear power plant, the ownership of which will be Hungar-
ian, will meet all fundamental conditions of electricity generation. The price of electric-
ity generated at the nuclear power plant is the lowest due to its extremely long service 
life and the smaller share of fuel costs within the total prime cost compared to other so-
lutions. Even in comparison with gas and coal power plants and renewable sources, the 
costs of the nuclear power plants calculated over their entire service lives are the lowest.
According to the domestic opposition’s hysteria, the Paks expansion would have a 
positive return only if electricity prices exceeded the current price two- or threefold. 
In our increasingly globalised world, only uncertainty is certain in the long term. Fore-
sight for decades, the application of the traditional market approach are almost im-
possible, in particular, in very capital intensive energy projects with very long payback 
periods. The estimation of demand and supply and prices 20 to 30 years in advance is 
uncertain. Therefore, long-term decisions may and must be made only with public/
government responsibility, with the intent to satisfying the actual social needs and on 
the basis of the information available at the time of the required action. (This is why, 
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in order to establish a power plant, the government of the United Kingdom was also 
forced to assume guarantee for the price of electricity for decades in advance.) The 
state responsible for supply is compelled to take the risk, because market operators 
not responsible for supply do not take it. We expand the nuclear power plant because 
there is no other realistic alternative to electricity supply to the country.8
The European Commission’s recently published Decision supports that the capacity mainte-
nance project of the Paks Nuclear Power Plant is a project of strategic importance for Hungary 
from the point of view of energy policy, which will also generate profits. According to the 
detailed study of the body based on February 2017 data, the expected return on the 
project (its internal rate of return) is 6.79% to 7.90% per year, while a private investor 
in the market would expect 7.40% to 8.35% from a similar project.
Notes 
1  It means the relatively cheap production of hydrocarbons (shale oil and shale gas) that can be produced 
with an unconventional technology. With the new hydraulic fracturing technology, reserves unavailable 
for production so far can be accessed. 
2  Népszabadság, 17 December 2011.
3   Our government successfully opposes globalomania also dominating the EU and its internal assistants. 
“Apparently, at the level of rhetoric, we must be seen to be perfectly cooperating, while in practice we 
must solely represent our own interests at any price” (Bogár, 2016).
4  Russian President Vladimir Putin declared during his visit to Budapest on 2 February 2017 that “I can 
say one thing for sure: Russian natural gas will come 100% and reliably to the Hungarian market”. Info 
Rádió, 3 February 2017.
5   The average age of domestic power plants is 27.4 years.
6   In Hungary, the grounds for the nuclear energy industry were laid by Professor András Lévai in the last 
century, who called for and taught the use of nuclear energy. He said this visionary sentence in one of 
his presentations in 1955: “It is no secret that our country is a specifically energy deficient country and, 
as such, we are among the first among the states of Europe, unfortunately, where the utilisation of the 
new energy source is a matter of life and death.”
7   According to Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, nuclear energy will be with us also in the next century. It is 
a great achievement that Hungary belongs to a few countries that are considered developed in terms of 
the nuclear industry, excellent with regard to its educational system and outstanding with regard to its 
safety system. The nuclear industry is an area in which Hungary has state-of-the-art technology. PAKS-
PRESS, 4 April 2016.
8  Támogatjuk a Paks II. projekt megvalósítását [We support implementation of Paks II project]. Position 
taken by the Energy Policy 2000 Association, http://enpol2000.hu/dokumentumok/allasfoglalasok/
article/67-%C3%81ll%C3%A1sfoglal%C3%A1sok%20/554-tamogatjuk-a-paks-ii-projekt-megvalosit.
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